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Theintroduction of the New Economic Plan in August 1971 marked
a dramatic change in the United States approach to the problem of
inflation. Relative to most countries, the United States had tradi-
tionally relied more heavily on policies that depressed resource
utilization as the means for curbing inflation. Acceptance of this ap-
proach was widespread; and after 1968, fiscal and monetary restraint
was viewed as appropriate. Reflecting these convictions, adminis-
tration officials stuck with their game plan of applying restrictive
stabilization policies, giving those policies two and a half years to
produce some evidence of success. The inflation rate, however, did
not decelerate, and most economic forecasts made during 1969—
1971 consistently underpredicted the magnitude of actual wage and
price increases.
The initial imposition of a ninety-day wage-price freeze was de-
signed to provide time for developing a control program without
introducing the types of inequities that preceded the imposition of
the Korean War controls. It was accompanied by a shift toward sig-
67nificantly greater fiscal and monetary stimulus in order to reduce
unemployment, and by a major.devaluation and a freeing of ex-
change rates.
Three "phases" of price and wage controls, spanning the years
1972—1973, followed the freeze period. This paper is directed
toward an evaluation of the impact of the control program during
those two years. A review of price and wage behavior prior to the
imposition of controls is presented in the first section. This is fol- s
lowed by a brief outline of the regulations of the control program
and an initial summary of price and wage changes during the con-
trol period. The major results of the study are given in the third
section, which contains a detailed examination of the impact of the
controls. Finally, in section four we summarize our major conclu-
sions and discuss some of the lessons learned from this attempt to
use an "incomes policy" to moderate the pace of inflation in the
U.S. economy.
WAGEAND PRICE BEHAVIOR FROM 1960
TO MID-1971
Inthis section we review wage and price trends in the decade pre-
ceding the imposition of wage and price controls in August 1971.
The discussion will be brief, as one of us has described the period
in considerable detail elsewhere.1 Selected wage-price-produc-
tivity data for those years appear in Table 1.
The data in panel A illustrate how much wage changes accel-
erated between 1960 and 1971. From 1960 to 1964, hourly earnings
in the private nonfarm economy grew at an average rate of 3.2 per-
cent per year. As output increased rapidly in 1965 and 1966, labor
markets tightened; overall unemployment declined and remained
below 4 percent of the civilian labor force through 1969. Average
wage irkreases accelerated and reached a rate of 6.5 percent by
1969.
Wage changes by industry exhibit some definite patterns during
1960—1969. Between those dates, manufacturing was not a sector of
especially rapid wage advances. Increases in manufacturing were
consistently less than the all-industry average; nonmanufacturing
had higher than average increases. Within nonmanufacturing,
services and construction are also singled out in panel A because
they exhibited especially high rates of increase. Rapid output
growth (in services) and market power (in construction) probably
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contributedto those sharp wage increases. Notice also that a rapid
acceleration of construction wages took place in 1969.
Through 1969, the wage trends depicted in panel A can be inter-
preted as largely the result of an increase in the excess demand for
labor. To reduce price inflation, which had been accelerating in
1968 and 1969, stabilization policy became restrictive in 1969.
Growth in real output and in man-hour productivity dropped
sharply during 1969 and 1970. Paralleling the lower real growth in
gross national product (GNP) was an increase in the unemployment
rate to 5.8 percent by the fourth quarter of 1970. However, the
loosening of labor markets in 1970 was not accompanied by a de-
celeration of wage changes. The all-industry increase in average
hourly earnings, in fact, rose from 6.5 percent in 1969 to 6.6 per-
cent in 1970 as manufacturing wage gains accelerated, while non-
manufacturing held steady at its 1969 rate of 6.8 percent. Wage
inflation decreased in trade and transportation, but this was offset
by continued increases in services and, particularly, in construc-
tion.
The data in panel A also show that rapid wage gains continued
into 1971. At annual rates, increases for all series except construc-
tion equaled or were above their 1970 rates during the first half of
1971. This remained true for manufacturing even after adjusting for
the effects of the auto strike in the fourth quarter of 1970.2 That
adjustment, however, did lower the manufacturing increase from
7.5 percent to 6.4 percent for the first half of 1971.
The failure of wage changes to decline in 1970—1971 despite the
increasing unemployment led to a widespread public discussion of
an adverse shift in the U.S. Phillips curve. Gordon, Friedman,
Perry, Phelps, and others have offered different explanations for
the observed shift.3 From this discussion the thesis of the changing
nature of labor markets and the accelerationist thesis both gained
adherents and have emerged as major competing explanations,
though not necessarily mutually exclusive, for the unusually rapid
wage advances observed since 1969.
Panel B of Table 1 follows union contract settlements, specifi-
cally first-year negotiated increases, in the decade prior to controls.
Median percent increases are shown through 1967 (through 1968
in construction), and then means are displayed for 1968 and later
periods. From 1960 to 1966, first-year negotiated increases rise at
roughly the same rate as average hourly earnings. Negotiated in-
creases consistenfly exceed gains in average hourly earnings in
1968, and by 1969 a sizable differential between the two is ap-
parent.








3.2 3.9 4.9 6.3 6.5
2.8 3.0 4.6 6.1 6.0
3.4 4.4 5.1 6.4 6.8
NA 5.1 5.4 6.2 6.9
3.9 4.5 5.6 7.1 8.5
B.First-Year Negotiated Wage Increasese
3.0 4.3 5.6 7.4 9.2 11.9 10.2
2.5 4.1 6.4 7.0 7.9 8.1 8.9
3.6 4.4 5.0 7.8 10.8 15.2 11.7
NA NA NA NA 9.6 14.311.5
3.7 4.3 7.5 10.1 13.1 17.613.9
C.Labor Costs and Prices
3.9 4.7 5.6 7.5 6.8 7.1 7.6
0.9 2.0 4.3 4.6 7.2 6.4 1.2
3.0 2.6 1.2 2.8 —0.4 0.7 6.2
1.1 1.8 3.3 3.5 4.5 5.0 3.9
Consumer price
index, all items 1.3 2.3 2.9 4.2 5.4 5.9 3.8
NA =notavailable.
aThrough 1970 all percent changes are based on annual averages. The 1971 first-half data
are based on changes from 19701V to 197111 in seasonally adjusted quarterly data, except
for the consumer price index. The CPI for the first half of 1971 is for the change from
December 1970 to August 1971, expressed at an annual rate. Negotiated wage changes
are for agreements settled during the period.
bAdjusted for interindustry shifts and for overtime in manufacturing. The 1960—1964
observation for construction is not adjusted for interindustry shifts.
c1ean first-year adjustments as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in
Current Wage Developments. From 1960 to 1967, medians are shown because BLS did
not publish means. Data refer to settlements involving 1,000 or more workers.
1Before 1966 nonmanufacturing excludes construction, services, and finance.
eDerived as a residual by subtracting the effect of construction settlements from all non-
manufacturing settlements.
1BLS started publishing settlements data for the construction industry in 1969. Observa-
tions for 1960 to 1968 are based on Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) data on median
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TABLE 1Selected Wages, Prices, and Productivity in the
Private Nonfarm Economy, 1960-1 971



























Thereis a continuing acceleration of negotiated wage changes
into 1970; they are widespread and by no means confined to con-
struction. For nonmanufacturing exclusive of construction, the
first-year increase rose from 9.6 percent in 1969 to 14.3 percent in
1970. Thus, the gap between negotiated settlements and hourly
earnings gains continued to widen in nonmanufacturing in 1970 to
the point where the former was twice the latter, i.e., 15.2 versus
6.8 percent.4
Average settlements in the first half of 1971 continued to rise in
manufacturing, but fell in rionmanufacturing. Yet settlements for
all sectors remained above their 1969 levels, and considerably
above levels compatible with low rates of inflation for the economy.
Finally, the data in panel B dramatically illustrate the acceleration
of construction wage settlements in the late 1960s, a trend that con-
tinued into 1970.
The implications of accelerating wage changes in the 1960—1971
period for unit labor costs and thus for price inflation are most
pessimistic, as illustrated by the data in panel C. Note that in-
creases in compensation per man-hour consistently exceed in-
creases in average hourly earnings throughout the period. This
reflects the rapid growth in nonwage compensation, a shift in the
employment mix toward white-collar workers and, perhaps, more
rapid increases in salaries than in wages during the period. Not
only did compensation gains accelerate between 1960 and 1970,
but a general slowing of productivity advances is also apparent in
panel C. The effects on man-hour productivity of the slowdown in
early 1967 and of the 1969—1970 growth stoppage are both dramatic.
In 1969 and 1970, this meant that increases in compensation per
man-hour were translated almost completely into higher unit labor
costs. Consequently, unit labor costs in the private nonfarm econ-
omy rose by 7.2 percent in 1969, and by 6.4 percent in 1970. The
increase in unit labor costs was reflected in higher prices; but par-
ticularly in 1969—1970, the rise in prices was less than that of labor
costs.
The data in panel C appear to show some evidence of reduced
price inflation during the first half of 1971. Although man-hour corn-
settlements. These settlements, in cents per hour, were converted to percentages and
deflated by 0.84 to be at levels compatible with BLS median settlements. The deflation
factor of 0.84 was the average ratio of BNA to BLS median first-year percent increases
for 1969—1073.
on data for all private nonfarm employees as published by BLS.
"Data are for private nonfarm GNP including the household and rest.of-world sectors.
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L.pensation rose at a rate above that of 1970, this was largely offset by
very rapidproductivity gains.5 Consequently, the rise in unit labor
COStS slowed to an annual rate of increase of just 1.2 percent, and
increases in both price series fell to annual inflation rates of slightly
below 4 percent, a substantial improvement over 1970. The im-
proved price performance of early 1971 merits closer attention, and
tables 2 and 3 provide more information about this period.
PRELUDETO CONTROLS
Thequestion of whether the inflation was coming to an end in early
1971 is crucial to any judgment about the effect of the controls. At
first blush, the slower advance of the CPI in early 1971 would seem
to offer support for the view that it was decelerating: the annual rate AN of increase during the first eight months fell to 3.8 percent, corn-
pared to an average of 5.9 percent in 1970. As shown in Table 2,
however, half of this apparent 2 percent deceleration can be at-
tributed to the reversal of mortgage interest rates as monetary
policy shifted toward expansion. Furthermore, while the slower in-
creases of the CPI are mirrored in the finished goods components of
the wholesale index, the rate of increase of intermediate materials
prices was accelerating.
Turning to a more comprehensive measure of price changes—
the private nonfarm deflator—we find an interesting contrast dis-
played in tables 1 and 2. The use of fixed industry weights sharply
reduces the apparent price deceleration of early 1971 from 1.1 per-
cent (5.0 percent to 3.9 percent in Table 1) to 0.4 percent (4.9 per-
cent to 4.5 percent in Table 2). Even this small amount of price Org
decelerationcan be traced to a sudden rise in the farm deflator
which was not yet fully reflected in finished goods prices. The fixed
weight deflators for consumer expenditures, fixed investment, and
government purchases show no change from their 1970 rates of
increase.
As noted, the aggregate wage indexes continue to increase at
their 1970 rates. The fixed weight hourly earnings index rose at an
annual rate of 7.6 percent during the first half of 1971 (7.4 percent
after adjusting for the auto strike), compared to 6.6 percent in 1970.
If the trend productivity gain of about 3 percent is subtracted from
this rate of increase, the rise in unit labor costs would be about
4.5 percent. There is a slowing of negotiated wage increases in con-
struction and in the rest of nonmanufacturing in this period. Nego-
72 Bosworth and Vromantiated increases in manufacturing, however, actually rose above the
1970 rate; and for all sectors, negotiated settlements of early 1971
exceeded the level of 1969 settlements.
Thus, the evidence of a quick end to inflation is limited to con-
sumer finished goods prices, with some indication from inter-
mediate materials prices that even this slowdown was transitory. In
sectors outside of contract construction, wage changes showed only
minor deviations from 1970 patterns. On the other hand, the costs of
aggregate demand restraint were considerable. The unemployment
rate stabilized at 6 percent in comparison to the 3.3 percent rate of
late 1968, and real GNP growth averaged only 1 percent between
the second quarters of 1969 and 1971.
ANOVERVIEW OF THE CONTROL PROGRAM
Thethirty-three months of price and wage controls consisted of four
distinct phases with significant changes over the period in the basic
• regulations and enforcement procedures. The first phase, a wage-
• price freeze, was essentially a transitory period and is not dis-
r cussedin detail in this paper.6 We are primarily concerned with the
three phases that followed the freeze period.
In this section, the organizational structure of the control pro-
gram and the basic regulations are outlined. We then summarize
the price and wage changes in 1971—1973 as a prelude to the more
detailed evaluation given in the subsequent econometric section.
OrganizationalStructure and Regulations
Onlya brief outline of the significant features of the control pro-
gram will be presented here since more detailed reviews are avail-
able elsewhere.7
The Cost of Living Council was responsible for administrative
control of the Phase II program. It determined which economic
units were subject to the controls and classified these units accord-
ing to the prenotifi cation and reporting requirements to which they
were subject. During Phase II, most specific price and wage de-
cisions were made by the Price Commission and the Pay Board. In
addition, there were several ancillary committees, including a
Committee on Interest and Dividends, and two special advisory
committees—.-.the Health Service Industry Committee and the





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Commiftee on State and Local Government Cooperation. Begin- ce
ning with Phase III,the Pay Board and Price Commission were al




ThePay Board was initially a tripartite organization with equal cc
representation of labor, business, and the public. After most of the fiij
labor members left, it operated as an essentially public board until hi)
its dissolution in Phase III. The general wage standard was an s8
overall guide relating wage increasei to the trend productivity P
growth of the economy plus prospective increases in the cost of a
living. The initial 5.5 percent limit on new wage contracts reflected
a targetinflation rate of 2.5 percent and a long-mn productivity
trend of 3 percent. Later action of Congress, exempting fringe bene-
fits, raised the effective standard to 6.2 percent. Congress also
excluded the "working poor" and required the board to permit
exceptions for agreements which included elements of productivity r
bargaining to reduce work-rule restrictions. c
Although this was a general wage ceiling, the regulations per-
miffed significant departures. Exceptions were allowed in new
agreements for historical tandem wage relationships and catch-up
allowances for multiyear contracts signed prior to the 1969—1971 t
acceleration of the price inflation. In addition, deferred increases
under existing contracts were not altered in any significant fashion.
Thus, the program was focused on new wage contracts rather than ?ric
existingwage rates. After the initiation of Phase III, the stabiliza-




Thebasic approach of the Price Commission was to approve a full t
percentage pass-through of all allowable cost increases. In general,
the definition of allowable costs included all costs—everything ex- I
cept profits. The regulations were later modified to require use ofa
Price Commission estimate of labor productivity growth rather than a
that of the individual firms. Exceptions were made for the trade I
sector, rent, and medical care. In the trade sector, only invoice
cost increases, marked up no more than during the freeze, could
be passed forward into prices, and for rent and medical care,
78 Bosworth and Vroman
Liceilings were placed on the size of price increases. The commission
also limited the allowable wage cost component of a price increase
to 5.5 percent. During P ase IV, foo manu acturers were p ace
under a margin control with a pass-through of materials costs on a
dollar-for-dollar basis.
Experience with the cost pass-through provisions during Phase
II indicated great technical problems because of the need to be-
come involved with the internal accounting practices of individual
firms. The allocation of overhead and joint operating costs is a
highly arbitrary process. Thus, from a practical point of view, a
second faliback regulation on profit margins became of greater im-
portance. That regulation limited profits per dollar of sales to an
amount equal to the average of earnings for the highest two out of
three fiscal years prior to the establishment of the control program.
Finally, the commission entered into term-limit pricing agree-
ments with some multiproduct firms as a means of reducing ad-
ministrative burdens. Under those arrangements, firms agreed to
hold their average price increases to 1.8 percent but were free to
raise individual product prices by larger amounts. The major
change during Phase Ill was a shift to voluntary compliance as
opposed to prenotification and prior approval of price increases.
Firms were also allowed to include 1972 in the calculation of the
profit-margin ceiling. In the middle of 1973 there was a return to
the requirement of prior approval for large firms.
?riceand Wage Changes during the Control Period
Someprogress in reducing the rate of inflation was made in the
nonagricultural sector during 1972. As shown in Table 2, the
annual rate of increase for nonfood items in the CPI declined from
4.7 percent prior to controls to about 3 percent. The deceleration
was particularly large for services—a full three percentage points
lower. The nonfarm deflator showed a decline of similar magnitude
to that of the nonfood component of the CPI.
Because of a growing problem with food prices, overall price per-
formance during the control period shows less evidence of a slow-
down. Thus, the rate of increase of the total CPI was substantially
above the target of 2.5 percent and only about one percentage point
below the precontrol rate of 4.5 percent. A significant moderation
of the inflation is also not evident in the wholesale price index
(WPI), which excludes services, as the rate of increase for indus-
trial prices slowed only slightly in 1972.
AnAppraisal of the Wage-Price Control Program 79On the wage side, there was a gradual butsteady reduction in p
the size of negotiated wage settlements—particularly in the con- en
structure sector. Asshown in Table 3, the slowdown ranged from 2
to 3 percent inthe last half of 1972. There were less apparent signs dc
of a slowdown, however, inthe hourly earnings data. Employee
compensation in the non farm sector rose by 6.6. percent in the last w
half of 1972, compared to 7.6 percent in the first half of 1971, and c9
7.1 percent in 1970. The fixed weight earnings index shows a
slightly larger decline of about 1.5 percentage points from the e
early-i97! rate of increase.
In 1973, the rate of price inflation accelerated sharply. During t
the year the CPI rose 8.8 percent, and the WPI rose 15.5 percent.
Initially, this inflation was heavily concentrated in the food sector, e
with a 45.8 percent rate of increase of farm prices in early 1973. At n
that time, the rate of increase of consumer nonfood items was still s
only 4.2 percent. However, a very large acceleration was also ap- v
parent in wholesale prices for crude and intermediate products
other than food. Later in the year, petroleum prices became an
additional major source of price inflation. The importance of food
and fuel price increases in the last half of 1973 is indicated by data
from the national income accounts. While prices of food and fuel
were rising at annual rates of 18 and 16 percent, respectively, prices
of other consumer items were rising at a 6 percent rate.8 Impa
Wages were slow to respond to the higher rate of price inflation.
Negotiated wage changes continued to decline in size throughout
the year. In part because of an increase in social security tax rates,
the hourly compensation measure increased more rapidly than in
1972. The hourly earnings index continued to show some decelera-
tion of wage increases in the first half of 1973, but returned to pre- I
controlrates later in the year.
ECONOMETRICRESULTS
Asimple comparison of price and wage increases before and during
the period of controls does not provide a very satisfactory basis for
evaluating the effects of controls. Only in a few situations is the Basic magnitude of change in the pattern of inflation sufficient for us to
conclude that the change was a result of controls. Such a compari-
son also implies that other economic variables that influence wages
and prices remained unchanged. But this was not the case. By late
1973, unemployment had Fallen from its August 1971 level of 6.1
80
IBosworthandVromanpercent of the labor force to 4.7 percent; the United States experi-
1 enced two substantial devaluations with implications for a changed
2 composition of exports and imports and increased pressures on
domestic prices; food prices rose sharply in response to crop fail-
e ures in several major countries; and there was a dramatic shift to-
ward shortages and price increases in world markets for basic
d commodities.
a As an alternative, we made some use of statistical equations to
e estimate the probable course of prices and wages in the absence of
controls. This, too, is not a very satisfactory method of estimating
g the effects of controls. The wage and price behavior that marked
t. the precontrol period is not well explained by existing statistical
equations. Yet similar equations have been used to infer the alter-
.t native path of wages and prices over a two-year period. In addition,
1 some of the disturbances during the period of controls, such as de-
- valuationand changes in international commodity markets, are
difficult to incorporate into existing price equations, which empha-
size domestic factors. Such equations, however, do provide some
guidance in summarizing the influence of changes in the under-
a lying economic conditions.
5
Impacton Wages
Econometricstudies of U.S. money wage behavior have prolif-
erated in recent years, and a thorough review of this literature is
beyond the scope of our paper.9 Some of the salient issues in this
literature are: (1) the proper measurement of labor-market tight-
ness; (2) the effects of price expectations on money-wage demands;
(3) the effects of direct taxes (payroll taxes as well as income taxes)
and (4) the effectiveness of income policies (in the 1962—1966
period as well as in the more recent initiatives from 1971—1974) in
retarding wage advances. Each of the four issues has generated
considerable. controversy; and, depending on one's point of view,
each has a large effect on how one would specify and estimate an
econometric wage equation. -
BasicEquations
After experimenting with several more elaborate specifications, we
elected to use a relatively simple specification of the wage equa-
tion.'0 Except for particular issues discussed later, we found that
the alternative specifications considered would not significantly
AnAppraisal of the Wage-Price Control Program
I81affect our analysis of the controi period. The general equation is of
the form
%W=a +bUR +c%P1 +dG
where
%W =quarterlypercent change in money wage rates
UR =theunemployment rate for civilian men 25 and older
%P_1 =aweighted average of recent changes in the CPI, weights being
respectively 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1 for the four quarters prior to the
current quarter
G =awage-price guidepost dummy variable with a value of unity
from 196211 through 196611 and zero in all other quarters
Four wage series were examined: (a) a fixed weight index of
straight-time hourly earnings in the private nonfarm economy; (b) a
fixed weight index of straight-time hourly earnings in manufactur-
ing; (c) the annual percent increase in wage rates negotiated in
manufacturing (first-year increases for multiyear contracts); and
(d) the percent increase in wage rates negotiated in the private sec-
tor, excluding manufacturing and construction. A description of the
sources and derivation of all the variables is contained in Ap-
pendix A. Data for these series were used to estimate equations for
1956—1969, and the regressions were then used to predict wage
developments foj the ensuing four years.
The actual coefficients and summary statistics for the four equa-
tions appear in Table 4. The overall fit of these equations is quite
good, with all adjusted coefficients of determination (R2) exceeding
0.6 and all standard errors 0.22 percent or smaller. On the basis of
R2 and the standard error, the statistical fit is better in the two
negotiated wage-change equations than in the other pair. Positive
serial correlation, however, is present in both equations for nego-
tiated wages, particularly equation 3, for manufacturing. Conse-
quently, there probably is some upward bias in the tstatistics
shown for those two equations.
The coefficients for the three independent variables are reason-
ably similar in all four equations, and all are significant by the usual
statistical criteria. More weight is attributed to price increases and
less to unemployment in equation 4 than in the other three equa-
tions, but much of this difference is probably caused by the un-
availability of negotiated wage data for 1956 and 1957. All four
equations suggest a slowing of wage changes during the period of
the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts but the point estimates of —0.22 to
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{DW} a UR %P1 G
1.Average hrly earnings, 1.41—0.14 0.33 —0.22 0.69
private nonfarrn (10.49)(5.58) (3.37) (3.61)[0.19]
(1,52)
2.Average hrly earnings, 1.37—0.13 0.29 —0.35 0.65
mfg. (8.54)(4.53) (2.49) (4.88)[0.22]
(1.81)
3.Negotiated increases, 1.29—0.10 0.31 —0.32 0.85
mfg. (15.85)(6.68) (5.21) (8.66)[0.11]
{0.60}
4.Negotiated increases, 1.25—0.06 0.56 —0.23 0.82
mfg. exci. construction5(10.54)(2.83) (6.49) (4.57)[0.14]
(1.28)
Although the coefficients agree closely in size and are significant,
they are quite sensitive to the period of fit. When earlier data are
included, the relative importance of unemployment rises and that
of prices declines. Adding later data points further enhances the
f importance of prices versus unemployment in explaining wage
) increases."This sensitivity must be kept in mind in estimating the
impact of the control program on wage changes during 1972 and
1973.
Results for Wage Controls
-
Equations 1 through 4 were used to predict quarterly wage changes
for 1968—1973, with actual values of the variables appearing on the
right-hand side of the equations. Semiannual averages of the re-
siduals expressed at annual rates are shown in Table 5. For com-
parative purposes, the standard errors of the original regressions
appear at the bottom of each column. The construction industry is
excluded because of the lack of historical data for union settle-
ments. This industry will be examined separately in the following
section.









= coefficientof multiple determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
SE =estimatedstandard deviation of the disturbance term.
DW =Durbin-Watsonstatistic.
'For definitions, see accompanying text.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sAverage residuals based on the equations of Table 4 appear in the p
firstfour columns. In all four of these equations, average residuals
are uniformly positive in the second half of 1970 and first half of
1971, as actual wage increases exceeded the predicted ones.
Further, six of these eight averages are more than twice the stan-
dard error of the underlying equation. The residuals in the nego-
tiated wage-change equations become increasingly positive for
each period after the second half of 1969 and are especially large
for the nonmanufacturing sector. During the period of controls,
these positive residuals steadily decline in magnitude.
Residuals in the equations estimated from earnings data decline
sharply in late 1971 and then increase in early 1972 in response to
the wage freeze and retroactive wage payments. The same type of
movement in the residuals is evident in late 1972, and has been
related to a bulge of nonunion increases at the beginning of the
second year of pay controls.'2 A smoothing of the underlying quar-
terly data, however, to reduce the impact of these two events, indi-
cates a uniform reduction in the size of the residuals throughout
1972 and early 1973. The gradual movement of actual wage in-
creases back toward the equation predictions is even more evident
in the figures for negotiated wage settlements.
The pattern of wage residuals discussed above is illustrated in
Figure 1, which shows actual and predicted negotiated wage
changes for the manufacturing sector for 1968—1973. Beginning in
1969, actual wage increases begin to exceed those anticipated from
historical relationships by increasingly large magnitudes. This pat-
tern is broken with the introduction of the control program, and the
two series gradually come back together—primarily because of a
reduction in the actual increases.
Because of the sensitivity of the coefficients of prices and unem-
ployment to the period of estimation, a second set of residuals is
also shown in Table 5. These are based on an estimation period
extending from 1958 through the first half of 1971, with a conse-
quent increase in the weight assigned to the price variable. Qualita-
tively, these residuals are similar to the first set. The tendency of
regressions to average residuals and reduce any extreme error is
clearly evident in 1970 and early 1971, but the residuals remain
large. The principal change is to raise the level of the predicted
increases over the control period, with the result that the smaller
positive residuals at the beginning are offset by larger negative
residuals in 1973. The predicted increases also accelerate more
during the rapid food and fuel inflation of late 1973.
Overall, these results suggest to us the following interpretation.
86 Bosworth and VromanFIGURE 1Negotiated Wage Increases in
Manufacturing, 1968-1973
(actual and predicted percent rates of
change at annual rates)
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NOTE:Predictions are based on equation 3 of Table 4. The equation
was fitted to data for 19561—19691V
During1969—197 1, there was a growing tendency for wage changes
—particularly in the union sector—to exceed the rate of increase
that would have been anticipated from historical relationships to
unemployment and price inflation. The magnitude of negotiated
wage changes increased despite an easing of labor market condi-
tions during the recession. By late 1970, this was being reflected in
large increases in average hourly earnings. The particularly large
residuals of late 1970 and early 1971 have been noted by others.
In a 1971 study, George Perry stated that the magnitude of wage
increases from 19701V to 197111 exceeded predicted levels from his
equations by an average annual rate of about one full percentage
point. The recent paper by Mitchell also shows a similar residual
pattern for these quarters. However, because he did not adjust for
the auto strike of 19701V, he shows a small residual for 19701V but
a very large residual for 1971I.'
The wage freeze sharply reduced these increases, but they
showed up again in the postfreeze period. In particular, negotiated
increases in early 1972 were the result of bargaining that had been
started in coal, steel, and the railroads before the freeze and which
was allowed to go through without major change. But during
Phase II, there was clearly a major decline in negotiated settle-
AnAppraisal of the Wage-Price Control Program 87ments: prefreeze residuals were very large and growing, but they
were eliminated by mid-1972 and throughout 1973.
Thus, one's view of the effectiveness of wage controls is de-
pendent upon the interpretation of wage behavior prior to the
freeze. If these large residuals indicated a permanent shift of wage
behavior, the controls succeeded in restoring historical patterns of
wage increases. Alternatively, if the wage behavior of early 1971
reflected only a temporary aberration, the controls had very little
impact. The change in the magnitude of the residuals after 1971
would suggest a decline during the control period of approximately
0.4 to 0.8 percent in the annual rate of increase for hourly earn-
ings.'4 The estimated reduction in union settlements ranges from
1.5 to 3.0 percent.
Because the control program focused on union settlements and in
the short run on newly negotiated contracts, equations based on
hourly earnings data may understate the long-mn impact of the pro-
gram. If the unusually large union wage adjustments of 1970—1971
had been permitted to continue into 1972 and 1973, their impact on
average hourly earnings would have been larger than in earlier
historic periods simply because these adjustments were becoming
so large. It is probably safe to say that such large adjustments were
tending to widen union-nonunion wage differentials. Had this been
permitted to continue into 1972 and 1973, it would have been re-
flected in more rapid gains in overall average hourly earnings. This
acceleration would have been further enhanced if nonunion
workers tried to retaliate and to maintain their earlier relative wage
position. Thus, the full impact of controls on hourly earnings would
extend beyond the initial periods with a cumulative effect.
Construction Industry
Wage changes in construction have exceeded all-industry averages
for the past decade. The data in Table 1 showed these wage
changes accelerating in the late 1960s and in 1970 with little
evidence of abating. Since unemployment rates in construction
were already high, rising to 9.7 percent in 1970 from 6.0 percent in
1969, it became widely recognized that traditional market forces
were not sufficiently strong to dampen wage increases in that in-
dustry. This situation led to the creation of the Construction Indus-
try Stabilization Committee (CISC) in March 1971.
Since regression analysis of construction industry wage changes
has not been very successful, we will focus on a tabular presenta-
tion of these wage data. In Table 6 we show quarterly percent wage
88 Bosworth and Vromanchanges at annual rates for 1970—1973. Three wage series are
shown: the Bureau of Labor Statistics fixed weight index of hourly
earnings; median first-year negotiated wage settlements, as re-
corded by the BLS for settlements involving 1,000 or more workers;
and median negotiated wage settlements effective for the life of the
contract for the same series of BLS contracts. Additionally, the
number of workers covered in the BLS settlements is shown.
These numbers should be considered relative to average industry
employment of about 3.5 million during these years.
In this industry, the hourly earnings data show substantial evi-
dence of deceleration. The increases for 1972 and 1973 are more
TABLE6 Construction Wages, 1970-1973



















19701 8.9% 15.7% 13.4% 130
II 8.0 14.7 13.9 417
III 11.5 19.0 14.9 112
IV 6.6 19.3 13.7 23
19711 8.6 18.0 16.7 13
Periodof Controls
197111 8.9 13.4 11.0 74
III 8.2 10.9 8.8 171
IV 5.9 10.9 9.3 55
19721 6.5 15.2 12.7 36
II 4.0 6.1 6.0 161
III 3.4 5.6 5.6 162
IV 9.0 4.6 3.1 97
19731 6.9 4.2 5.0 154
II 3.2 4.7 5.3 312
III 6.0 4.4 4.6 270
IV 3.5 5.2 5.2 170
SOURCE: Average hourly earnings are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics;
negotiated settlements are from BLS, Current Wage Detelopments,
June 1974, appendix tables, and earlier issues. Data refer to settle-
ments involving 1,000 or more workers.
AnAppraisal of the Wage-Price Control Program 89than 3 percent below the 9.2 percent rate of increase which pre-
vailed for the 1969—19711 period.
An even more dramatic pattern of deceleration is evident in the
settlement data. With the introduction of the CISC in the second
quarter of 1971, first-year settlements declined immediately, and
then fell to even lower levels in the second quarter of 1972.15 From
the middle of 1972 through the end of 1973 these settlements were
closely in line with the original Pay Board guidelines. The life-of-
contract data strongly parallel the first-year median settlements.
Again there are sharp declines in the second quarters of 1971 and
1972. Similar results are obvious in the data for mean settlements
(as opposed to medians) and for compensation (rather than wages).
Thus, all the data are consistent with the conclusion of a large and
abrupt decline in wage settlements after March of 1971.
Controls and Negotiated Wage Settlements
In the previous sections we stressed the greater impact of wage
controls on negotiated settlements relative to average hourly earn-
ings. Because the program focused on union settlements—particu-
larly new contracts—they are explored more fully in this section,
using annual data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on new con-
tracts and effective wage changes.'6 Data for union settlements
involving 1,000 or more workers are shown in Table 7 for the
period 1966—1973. Consistent industry coverage including con-
struction, services, and finance became available only in 1966.
The percent distribution of first-year wage adjustments and of
total wage changes effective during the year are shown in panels A
and B, respectively. Between 1966 and 1971, the data in both
panels show similar shifts in the distribution of wage changes: a
steady decrease in the proportion of workers in the category "under
5 percent" and a rapid rise in the proportion in the "over 9 percent"
category. The upward shift was reversed after controls were intro-
duced in 1972 and 1973. This reversaiwas particularly evident
for first-year settlements in panel A. The increased percentage of
settlements in the under-5-percent category is not consistent with
the view that the general wage standard served as a floor for wage
settlements. For first-year settlements, 17 percent were in the
under-5-percent category in 1972, and 26 percent were in that cate-
gory in 1973.'
A more systematic display of the shift in effective wage changes
is contained in panel C. The second line shows the time pattern of
median wage changes; the wage change for the first and third
90
IBosworth and Vromanquartiles are shown in the first and third lines. A measure of relative
wage dispersion, the interquartile range divided by the median, is
shown in the last line. Except for 1969, the median increased
steadily throughout the1966—1971 period. The first-quartile
changes, however, rose most sharply in 1968 and 1969, while in-
creases in the third quartile were concentrated in 1970 and 1971.
Consequently, the measure of relative dispersion dropped in 1968
and 1969 but was very large in 1970 and 1971.
During the control period, the measure of relative dispersion
declined sharply. In contrast to the 1968—1969 episode, however,
this decline resulted from a lowering of the third quartile rather
than an increase in the first. Thus, the compression of the distribu-
tion during the control period is primarily the result of a sharp
reduction in the incidence of very large wage increases.
A decomposition of the effective wage changes is shown in panel
D. Such increases can be traced to those resulting from newly
negotiated contracts, deferred adjustments of contracts negotiated
in prior years, and cost-of-living escalator clauses. The primary
focus of the wage controls was on newly negotiated contracts. Dur-
ing the first year of controls, the mean effective adjustment fell from
9.2 to 6.6 percent. All of this decline resulted from the smaller role
of the first-year adjustments, since deferred and cost-of-living ad-
justments were unchanged. However, since the number of negoti-
ated contracts varies from year to year, not all of the reduced con-
tribution from first-year adjustments can be attributed to controls or
to any other behavioral factors: bargaining in 1972 was light. Of the
total decline of 2.6 percent, 1.6 percent was due to the declining
proportion of workers negotiating new contracts.'8
In 1973 the contribution of first-year settlements increased even
though their average size declined (5.8 percent in 1973 versus
6.6 percent in 1972). This was the result of a larger volume of con-
tract negotiations in 1973, with a consequent increase in their con-
tribution. The smaller contribution of deferred increases in 1973
reflects both the low level of bargaining activity in the previous
year and the reduced size of the settlements.
The acceleration of effective wage adjustments can be traced to
the greatly increased contribution of escalator clauses. Escalator
clauses are becoming more prevalent, as expectations of large and
continuing price increases are now widely held. However, this
ascendancy is a consequence of recent inflationary experience and
not a response to the control program per se. Mitchell and Weber
report that escalator clauses actually declined in frequency during
Phase JJ19




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Average contract duration has tended to decrease inthe 1972—
1974 period. For example, the median durationof contracts nego-
tiated during 1973 was 28 months. In the immediately prior round
of settlements, these same contracts had a median duration of
32 months.2° This shortening of contracts, however, should be
attributed in part to inflation rather than to effects of the control
program. Durationof contracts will probably show a continued
decrease this year (1974), especially in settlements where escalator
provis ions are not part of the package.
Strike activity during 1972 and 1973 was rather low compared to
other years. Only 0.15 and 0.14 percent of man-days was lost
through strikes in 1972 and 1973, respectively. These percentages
were lowerthan in any year since 1966.21 Given the unusually
heavy bargaining schedule of 1973, it would seem that the control
program did not increase the difficultiesfor labor and management
in arriving at mutually agreeable settlements. Perhaps the existence
of pay controls even helped by reducing the upper range of feasible
wage settlements.
In summary, both the average size of contract settlements and
their relative dispersion were sharply reduced during the period of
wage controls. The abruptness of this change creates a strong pre-
sumption that the controls were a significant causal factor. Finally,
although cost-of-living escalators became more common and con-
tract duration became somewhat shorter, these aspects of change
seem to be related more to the inflation than to the existence of
controls. Both trends have continued since the termination of
Phase IV.
Impacton Prices
Theprice control regulations varied among major sectors of the
economy, and for that reason, we have undertaken some disaggre-
gation of the available data. Major distinctions can be made among
the controls applied to retail and wholesale trade, services, manu-
facturing firms, and the food industry. A separate examination of
each of these sectors offers an opportunity to evaluate the impact of
different types of control regulations.
Retail and Wholesale Trade
Firms in the trade sector were required to maintain a percentage
gross markup over invoice costs that was no higher than that of the
freeze period. Thus, only increases inthe costs of goods to the firm
94 Bosworth and Vromancould serve as a basis for an increase in selling price. By not allow-
ing a pass-through of high operating costs, the regulation resulted
in some additional restraint beyond a full-cost justification of price
increases: productivity growth in the trade sector is less than that of
the rest of the economy, while its wage increases match those of
other industries. However, this exclusion of operating costs be-
comes quite unimportant for substantial increases in invoice costs.
Normally, the trade sector would not be viewed as a target for
price controls, since it is considered to be quite competitive. The
reduction of rates of return below.long-run equilibrium levels can
only result in a bulge of price increases after controls are removed.
On the other hand, the regulation was clear and easy for firms to
comply with, since it was designed to follow the pattern of their
normal pricing procedures. By exempting firms with fewer than
sixty employees, the Price Commission was able to reduce an other-
wise overwhelming monitoring burden to manageable size. How-
ever, the loose definition of normal margin, shifts in product mix,
and conflicts between categorical and item-by-item pricing all
made enforcement of the regulations more difficult.
Our efforts to measure the impact on retail trade margins are
based upon a comparison of the CPI and WPI indexes for consumer
finished goods. Differences in the types of products included in the
two indexes and variations in the weights attached to individual
• items complicate any such comparison. The elimination of food and
fuel products from the nondurables component and the removal of
used cars and home purchases from the CPI index for durables
do improve comparability, but the lists of products included still
are not identical. An attempt was made to restructure the WPI index
at the four-digit level, using CPI weights, but the results were not
significantly different from those obtained using regularly pub-
lished indexes. The primary effect of the lack of full comparability
should be to increase the standard error of any regression equation.
There would be no reason to expect a bias in any particular direc-
tion during the period of controls. Aggregation should average out
some of the individual product differences.
The equations used to relate retail prices to wholesale costs
closely parallel those of a pricing model by stage of processing
developed by Joel Popkin.22 The specific equations were estimated
for the 1956—1970 period and are presented in Appendix B. These
equations were projected through the control period, using other
variables such as wholesale prices, wage rates, and capacity utiliza-
tion at their actual levels. The residuals from these predictions are
summarized in Table 8.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DThere is some weak evidence that the margin controls did de-
press retail prices relative to wholesale costs. For both durables
and nondurables, the average of the residuals is slightly negative
over the control period. However, the large residual for durables
during the last half of 1971 is almost wholly due to the automobile
exise tax cut. Elimination of this observation results in a pattern of
residuals within the range anticipated from the standard error of the
regression, and showing only a slight negative tendency. Thus, the
restrictive influence would seem to be of minimal importance. The
regulations appear to have allowed firms to do about what they
would have done in the absence of controls. From a strictly eco-
nomic point of view, it is not clear that controls on this sector were
worth the effort.
ServiceSector
Theservices component of the consumer price index includes a
highly heterogeneous group of industries that were subjected to
several distinct types of controls. Medical care services are the most
frequently cited example of a substantial impact of the price con-
trols. During Phase II, a 2.5 percent cap on increases in physicians'
and dentists' fees was applied. Price increases by medical care
institutions had to be cost justified, and they could not be raised
above 6 percent without special Price Commission approval.23
In the area of regulated utilities, the Price Commission delegated
authority to the existing regulatory agencies but retained the right
to review their decisions. Finally, a large number of small personal-
service firms were exempt from the formal regulations.
As shown in Table 8, the category of services except rent is one
that shows a substantial deceleration of inflation throughout the
period of price controls. The underlying equation includes vari-
ables representing labor costs, mortgage interest rates, and cyclical
output. Thus, the indicated slowdown of 0.7 percent is in addition
to these cost factors. The residuals are consistently negative
throughout the control period, although there is some evidence of
a lessening of the restraint near the end of 1973. Among the major
components (not shown), medical care and other services had sub-
stantial negative residuals. However, household services, which in-
cluded most of the regulated industries, showed no apparent de-
cline beyond that which could be anticipated from lower mortgage
interest rates in 1972. Also, much of the slowdown in the category
of transportation services resulted from the adoption of no-fault
AnAppraisal of the Wage-Price Control Program 97insurance in several large states rather than representing the effect
of controls.
The controls on rent included a 2.5 percent cap on the pass-
through of general costs, the full pass-through of taxes, and a re-
covery of the costsof capital improvements. About half the market
wasexempt—including all new construction—and the controls
wereterminated with the introduction of Phase III. The regula-
tions appear to have resulted in a temporary slowing of about 0.5
percent in the rent index. There was an immediate drop in the rate
of increase coincident with the introduction of controls and a re-
turn to former rates of increase when controls were removed in
1973.
ManufactUring Prices
Our measure of the influence of price controls on prices of manu-
factured goods is based on equations which are more aggregated
than those of Popkin. Three categories of finished goods prices—
nondurables except food and fuel, consumer durables, and pro-
ducer durable equipment—are related to raw materials prices, labor
costs, capacity utilization, and cyclical fluctuations in labor pro-
ductivity. Thus, we have aggregated over the intermediate stages
of production.
In all three cases, the residuals of Table 8 show an average nega-
tive effect during the period of controls. For both categories of
durables, however, the residuals are very erratic, with several large
positiveresiduals. These sharp fluctuations were caused by
changes in the timing of automobile price increases. In both years,
fall price increases were delayed by the Price Commission into the
early part of the following year. Thus, the inclusion of the price
increases of early 1974 would substantially reduce the estimated
effect of controls. Alternatively, exclusion of the last half of 1973
results in average values of the residuals very close to zero. The
pattern of residuals for nondurables except food and fuel is more
consistent in indicating a restraining influence of the controls.
Food Prices
Food prices must play a key role in the success of any price-wage
controls program. Food costs represent a major portion of consumer
spending. But, more important, food prices are likely to become the
standard by which the general public will judge the performance of
any anti-inflation effort. Price changes for products purchased on a
98 BosworthandVromandaily or weekly basis are far more visible than those for infrequent
purchases, such as automobiles and household durables. Most
• economists, however, would support the view that food production
is a highly competitive sector of the U.S. economy, where the effect
of controls wouid most likely be to replace price increases with
rationing. Given the difficulties of operating controls and the
limited potential gains, the original decision to exempt raw agricul-
tural products seemed reasonable.
The explosive rise of food prices, which began in late 1972, led to
numerous demands that the controls be broadened to cover food
products. On the other hand, opponents of price controls argued
that the disruption of this market was itself caused by controls.
Meanwhile, the Agriculture Department confused the issue further
by alleging that the problem resulted from rising consumer demand
for food. Claims that the farmer was not receiving the higher prices
• resulted in numerous investigations of profiteering by middlemen.
Today, it is clear that the rise in food prices had its primary
• origins in a huge expansion of U.S. agricultural exports. The magni-
• tude ofthis export expansion and its impact on reserve stocks in the
• United States are shown in Table 9. World grain production fell
• sharply relative to expanding demand as adverse weather condi-
tions were experienced in the USSR, South Asia, and Saharan
Africa. Since the United States was a supplier of last resort in agri-
cultural products, the dollar value of exports rose by 88 percent in
1973. In the 1972—1973 crop year the volume of feed grain exports
rose 58 percent and wheat exports increased 87 percent. However,
the United States had become increasingly ill-equipped to fulfill
this stabilization function. Grain reserves had been sharply re-
duced as acreage set-aside programs with direct cash payments to
farmers were substituted for the previous system of stockpiling
• large amounts of grain. This resulted in less flexibility to meet
short-run increases in demand. In addition, the United States did
not shift toward a policy of stimulating production until reserves
had declined to extremely low levels. The grain situation was
made worse by the termination of fish-meal exports from Peru,
which led to a chaotic market for soybean products, a high-protein
feed substitute.24
The initial rise of meat prices was related more to cyclical lows
in cattle and hog marketings than to world market conditions. The
production of meat actually declined in both 1972 and 1973. How-
ever, high feed costs did limit substitution of poultry for meat, and
with the passage of time high feed costs became a more significant
element of the meat supply situation. Price controls in the middle
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LJof 1973 made the short-term situation worse in meat because price
ceilings were not raised as feed costs increased. Also, the prior an-
nouncement of a termination date for the price ceilings caused
much of the problem.
Despite the publicized claims, there is little evidence that the
rise of retail food prices represented anything more than a simple
pass-through of higher farm prices. The recent revision of the na-
TABLE9 Selected Statistics on Production of Meat and
Poultry, Wheat, and Feed Grains, Various Periods,
1960-1 973
1960— 1970— 1971— 1972—
Status " Product 1970 1971 1972a 1973k
1973—
1974b
Meat and Poultry (inspected slaughterings;
average annual percent rate of change)C
Meats, total 3.4 4,7 —1.6 —5.9
poultry 5.2 1.1 6.2 —2.2
Wheat (millions ofbushels;marketing yeard)
Beginning carry-over 885 731 863 439
Production 1,351 1,618 1,545 1,711
Total supply 2,2372,350 2,4092,154
Domestic disappearance 768 855 786 757
Exports 738 632 1,185 1,148
Ending stocks 731 863 439 249
Feed grain& (millions of tons; marketing yeard)
Beginning carry-over 48.6 33.2 48.4 32.4
Production 160.1 207.7 199.9 205.0
Total supply 209.1 241.4 248.7237.7
Domestic disappearance 155.2 165.7 173.2 173.4
Exports 20.7 27.3 43.1 43.7
Ending stocks 33.2 48.4 32.4 20.6
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, July 1974, pp. S27—S29, and earlier issues; U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Demand and Price Situation, August 1974,
Table 2.
a Figures for wheat and feed grains are preliminary.
bFigures for wheat and feed grains are estimates.
Calculated from calendar-year production data, by weight.
dTwelvemonth marketing year, spanning the pairs of years indicated in the column
headings.
elneludes imports.
'Includes corn, oats, barley, and grain sorghum.








Sumitional income accounts makes clear the rise of farm income, which
doubled between the fourth quarters of 1971 and 1973. The Depart-
ment of-Agriculture maintains a price index of farm values using
weights identical to those of the CPI series for domestically pro-
duced farm products. A comparison of the two indexes indicates
• that the farm-retail spread rose by 2.0 percent in 1972 and 6.5 per-
cent in 1973. Compared to an average increase of 5.1 percent in the
previous two years, and from what can be inferred about increases
in labor, transportation, rent, and packaging costs, these increases
do not seem large.
We conclude that price controls did not significantly alter food
costs. Because of the competitive structure of the industry, controls
that allowed for cost pass-throughs were of minor importance.
Price controls cannot deal effectively with supply shortages. In the
short run, restrictions on grain exports would have been the only
effective means of limiting domestic price increases. However,
this decision would have involved serious problems for American
foreign trade policy.
Summary
In general, the results of this section imply a smaller direct impact
of controls on prices than would be inferred from a simple examina-
tion of the price indexes of Table 2. Factors other than controls
were changing during much of the control period, and, on balance,
causing a decline in the predicted price increases. In addition, the
disaggregation indicated the importance of special factors such as
removal of the automobile excise tax, the adoption of no-fault insur-
ance, and the delay of automobile price increases.
The pass-through of the impact on wholesale prices into the con-
sumer price index implies that the annual rate of price increase was
reduced by approximately 0.5 percent during the control period.
However, this does not represent the full impact of the controls,
because we have used actual wage changes in the price equations.
As discussed in the section on wage controls, we find evidence of
additional restraint in this area. Finally, the lower rate of price in-
creases would have some indirect feedback effect: slower price
inflation resulting in some moderation of wage increases and, thus,
of the cost increases to be passed forward in future periods.
The largest direct effect of controls seems to have been in the
service sector, where the regulations were tailored to specific in-
dustry characteristics. As might be anticipated, controls had little
AnAppraisal of the Wage-Price Control Program 101impact on the trade sector, where competitive factors are believed
to be quite strong. Within manufacturing, nondurables provided the
most consistent evidence of restraining influences. The pattern of
residuals for durable prices was more erratic, with some evidence
that the greatest effect came from simple delays of automobile price
increases.
One interesting result of these equation residuals is that they do
not indicate any acceleration of inflation after the shift to Phase III.
Although the actual rate of price increase does accelerate, this is
more than accounted for by a sharp rise of raw materials costs, the
impact on labor costs of the increase in social insurance taxes, and
the delayed implementation of the automobile price increases.
On the other hand, this may be too simple a basis on which to
conclude that the shift was not important. Certainly, the way in
which Phase III was introduced did much to reduce public con-
fidence in and support for the program. In addition, some more
detailed components of the wholesale price index indicate a
sharper rate of increase after January 1973. Most of these fall within
the WPI category of intermediate goods except food, which rose at
an annual rate of 16.1 percent between January and April 1973 corn-
pared to 3.4 percent in the previous three months. Finding ajustifi-
cation for an acceleration of this magnitude in the underlying cost
data is difficult. However, given the size of later increases in food
prices, raw materials shortages, and the second devaluation, the
shift to Phase III was not a major factor in the 1973 price inflation.
The estimated direct impact of controls on prices is somewhat
smaller than that implied by previous studies. A recent study by
Robert Gordon provides the best example of the results obtained
from an aggregate application of the econometric approach.25 In
addition to estimating the effect of controls on wages and simulat-
ing the feedback effect, Gordon obtains an average direct effect on
prices of 1.1 percent. In part, the lower estimated impact relative to
Gordon reflects differences in the underlying equations and, thus,
in the estimates of what the path of the inflation would have been
in the absence of controls. In the case of the Gordon study, how-
ever, there are significant differences in the data used. His analysis
focuses on a fixed weight deflator for the nonfarm sector, taken from
the national income accounts, and which is similar to the index pre-
sented at the bottom of Table 2. Both indexes show a larger de-
celeration of the inflation during 1972 than either the CPI or WPI.
Some of this difference is attributable to the inclusion of construc-
tion prices in the nonfarm-sector index. Except for single-family
residential construction, these measures are heavily based on wage
102 BosworthandVromanrates; and, as shown in the section on wage controls, construction
wages decelerated sharply after the introduction of controls.
Second, these are value-added deflators, whereas the CPI and WPI
measure prices of goods. The deflators include negative effects
from import prices and farm products. Since both of these price
indexes rose very sharply during the control period, they reduce the
value-added deflators relative to finished goods prices.
The private nonfarm deflator isa broader measure of price
change, and on a conceptual basis it is preferable to either the CPI
or WPI. However, the quality of the price data is very low for both
construction and imports. Gordon's index, also, indicates a slower
rate of price increase over the controls period than the index of
Table 2, which is derived from the Commerce Department fixed
weight index for the private sector minus the impact of changes in
the farm deflator. The Commerce index involves a more detailed
set of weights than those available to Gordon. Some overstatement
is also implied by his apparent inclusion of the automobile excise
tax as part of the effect of controls.
Most studies do agree, however, that there was some suppression
of prices beyond a simple pass-through of the wage restraint. We
not only believe that this added price restraint was smaller than
implied by other studies, but we are very doubtful that the results
can be used to infer that a significant squeezing of profit margins
occurred. Since most price equations are based on some measure of
"normal" or trend productivity, knowledge of the path of the aggre-
gate price-wage ratio does not provide information about the dis-
tribution of income between profits and wages until actual labor
productivity has been spenfied. The extent to which cyclical fluc-
tuations in productivity are incorporated into price changes is a
matter of great uncertainty. William Nordhaus indicates that labor
productivity change—and thus profits—is critically affected by the
distribution of output among industries.26 In addition, he attributes
the decline of corporate profit margins to events that took place
before the introduction of price controls. Finally, our own results
indicate that much of the restraint on prices was in sectors such as
medical care services, where restraint did not have direct implica-
tions for the return on capital.
We are reluctant to conclude that a profit squeeze was a major
result of the controls. While the statistical results give some evi-
dence for such a view, they are not unambiguous. In addition, the
loose administration of the price controls makes it difficult for us
to believe that they could have resulted in significant price restraint
in the industrial sector.
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ci
In general, the interpretation of thecontrol program presented in
the previous sections is more favorable than that held by most econ- t
omistsor the general public. Much of the prevalent disillusionment
is the result of the 1973 experience,when the rate of price increase
exploded despite the existence of controls. However, we feel the
events of 1973 illustrate the changing nature of the U.S. inflation
problem and not the inevitable collapse of wage and price controls. la
Widespread crop failures led to a major world food shortage, and a s
coincident rapid economic expansion in the major industrial coun-
tries raised the demand for raw materials at a rate that suppliers
could not satisfy in the short run. These two problems were made
worse by a second U.S. devaluation and the conversion to flexible r
exchange rates—events that temporarily increased speculative s
pressures in the commodity markets. Finally, the oil embargo and
the steep price increases that followed sharply intensified infla-
tionary pressures. Not one of these developments was in any way
caused by wage and price controls nor were they the types of infla-
tion problems for which controls were a potential cure.27 Thus,
1973 and 1974 would have been years of accelerating price inflation
with or without controls. The rigid application of controls in these
circumstances could only have resulted in rationing, black markets,
and other distortions. American industrial workers lost substantial
real income to farmers and the oil-producing countries, but controls
could not be the means for restoring this loss.
The experience of recent years clearly indicates the need todis-
tinguish different types of inflationary processes if we are to select
appropriate anti-inflationary policy responses. The classical situa-
tion of excessive aggregate demand is but one type of inflation. The
1966—1969 period is one in which demand pressures seem to have
been a primary cause of price and wage increases. In such situa-
tions, the traditional remedies of demand restraint may be appro-
priate.
However, the argument for demand restraint is more difficult to
make in reference to the situation in 1970 and 1971. Even if this
period reflects only a lagged response of prices and wages to prior
episodes of excess demand, the long lags imply that restrictive
stabilization policies can become very costly in terms of unemploy-
ment and lost output. Since most markets had substantial amounts
of excess capacity, other factors must have played a role. In the
labor market, the Phillips curve was too simple an explanation of
wage behavior. In part, the continuation of high rates of wage in-
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.-------- ..4çcreases seems to have been related to attempts to catch up for past
changes in relative wages or to expectations of continued price
inflation.28 Such a situation may provide justification for controls if
they are directed toward stabilizing the relative wage and price
structure with less overall inflation. But it is still only a temporary
need.
Finally, the situation of 1973 is characteristic of an inflation that
is related to supply disruptions in a few basic industries—particu-
larly in food and fuel. Controls cannot effectively deal with real
supply shortages; moreover, the application of general restraint can
be very expensive unless the demand for such commodities has a
very high income elasticity. In the long run, the aggregate impact
of these disruptions can be reduced by the holding of adequate
reserve stocks. If these stocks do not exist the options for policy are
severely limited.
Any conclusion regarding the impact of controls on wages is de-
pendent upon one's interpretation of wage behavior prior to the
imposition of controls. If the unexpectedly high level of wage
settlements in 1970—1971 represented a permanent shift of be-
havior, the controls had a substantial restrictive effect. On the other
hand, if that was only a temporary development, the controls were
not very important.29 In the case of contract construction, however,
the size of the deceleration makes it difficult to disregard the role
of the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee.
Second, the focus of the pay controls on new negotiated wage
settlements is important in any attempt to measure their impact.
The implications for actual wage payments were not immediate and
extended beyond the period of controls. Deferred increases, which
were a large part of actual wage changes in 1972, were allowed to
go through with only minor modifications. Substantial emphasis
was placed on eliminating distortions in the relative wage structure
even if it meant that some settlements exceeded the general guide-
• line.
The general pay standard was frequently criticized on the basis
that it failed to reflect the complexities of relative wages and other
factors that are involved in actual wage settlements. In addition, it
• was alleged that such a standard would serve as a floor rather than
a ceiling for wage increases.
Such criticisms of a rigid adherence to a single number may be
valid, but this was not the nature of the general standard applied
during Phase II. There was recognition of other factors in several
exceptions to the 5.5 percent guideline. Examples of this were the
• catch-up provisions, exemptions for productivity bargaining, and
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evidencein the data of the previous sections thatthe standard did
become a floor for wagesettlements. Since the United States does
not have alabor market dominated by large national unions, some
general guide to reasonable wage increases wasuseful for the
smaller union settlements and those inthe nonunion area. A pay
board cannot be expected to play anactive role in every wage
negotiation.
On the price side there is someevidence that controls retarded
increases by more thanwould have been expected from a simple
passthrough of costs. The most significant slowdown of the infla-
tion was inservices—particularly medical care. In the food sector
and in retail trade, the behavior of prices appears tohave corre-
sponded closely to what would have been anticipated in the ab-
sence of controls.
The experience with controls did make evident the majortech-
nical problems of administering price regulations. The allocationof
resources is more sensitive to changesin relative prices than in
relative wages, and problems of shortages can quickly develop. The
total cost pass-through provisions were very difficult toenforce
because their implementation involved the regulators in the in-
ternal cost accounting practices of individual firms. The regulations
could also be criticized for using total costs instead of direct or
marginal costs, The allocation of overhead costs among individual
products involved the greatest technical problems, and fluctuations
in sales volume had perverse effects on allowable pricechanges.
It is of interest to note that the greatest impact of the controls ap-
pears to have been in the service sector,where direct limitations on
market prices were used instead of allowable costs. In contrast, one
study concluded that there was no correlation between industrial
price increases as reported in the WPI during Phase II and ap-
provals of the Price Commission.3°
In conclusion, it should be kept in mind that the control program
was not one of severe wage and price restraintintended to achieve
an immediate end to the inflation.Instead, it was a modest effort
with modest results. The focus was on a gradual reduction of the
inflation rate. Some initial progress was mad. In addition, a major
benefit was the justification provided for the redirection of fiscal
and monetary policy toward the goal of increasing the level of re-
source utilization. Subsequentdevelopments—which, however,
seem to have been largely independentof the existence of con-
trols—eliminated most of the progress toward lower inflation and
unemployment.
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Theeconometric wage equations used four different dependent
variables, each measured in quarterly percent changes. They were
(a) a fixed weight index of straight-time hourly earnings for the
• private nonfarm economy; (b) a fixed weight index of straight-time
hourly earnings in manufacturing; (c) median negotiated increases
in manufacturing; and (d) median negotiated increases in non-
manufacturing exclusive of the construction industry. The two
series on average hourly earnings are published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and are adjusted for interindustry employment
shifts and for overtime in manufacturing.
The two series on negotiated settlements are based on quarterly
• data published by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA). Lester3'
has described these data in some detail. They are the only quarterly
settlement data available for a reasonably long time period. Quar-
terly median increases, in cents per hour, go back to 19561 for
manufacturing and to 19581 for nonmanufacturing exclusive of con-
struction. For multiyear contracts BNA includes just the first-year
increase in that quarter's median. These BNA series are closely
akin to BLS data on "first-year changes in contracts negotiated dur-
ing year," which appear in Current Wage Developments. BNA
• median increases were divided by average straight-time hourly
earnings of the previous quarter to convert the former to percent
changes. The average hourly earnings series for manufacturing is
regularly published. An index for nonmanufacturing (1967 =100)
was derived by subtracting the manufacturing index times its
wefght (0.3384) in the overall index, from the overall private non-
farm index of straight-time earnings. The resulting series was di-
vided by 0.6616 (to index it at 100 for 1967) and then multiplied by
0.0268 (average hourly earnings in the private nonfarm economy in
1967) to convert to a cents-per-hour basis. The median percent
change in nonmanufacturing negotiated settlements was then esti-
mated as the ratio of the median negotiated increase for nonmanu-
facturing to this average hourly earnings series lagged one quarter.
Both series of negotiated wage increases are available upon
request.
Except for the wage-price guidepost dummy (G), the inde-
pendent variables used in the Table 4 regressions are based di-
rectly on data regularly published by BLS; the dummy equals 1
from 196211 to 196611 and zero in all other quarters. George Perry
and Robert J. Gordon kindly supplied us with unemployment and
tax-rate data, which were used in initial equation specifications.
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Theprice equations used to investigate the impact of the controls
are a modification of those published in Popkin, "Consumerand
Wholesale Price Increases" (see note 22, below). All the data are S
seasonally adjusted quarterly percent changes for the period 1956—
1970. All price indexes are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Serviq
all wage rates are fixed weight indexes adjusted to include fringe
benefits. Several capacity utilization measures were tried, with the
McGraw-Hill index showing the greatest significance. A time trend
was used to approximate normal productivity growth, except where
some cyclical correction was significant. Highly insignificant co-
efficients were deleted from the regressions, and the lag structures
are the result of experimentation. In contrast to other published
equations in which the Almon polynomial lag estimation technique
was used, longer lags were not found to be significant.
RetailPrices (Consumer Price Index)
DurableSExcluding Used Cars and Home Purchase
DCPID =0.59DWPICD +0.16flWPICDI +0.20DWRTI Wh (6.3) (1.5) (2.7)
+0.22DWRT_2 —1.17DMY6503 —0.43 Cons
(2.9) (4.6) (3.8)
R20.78; SE =0.25;DW =1.9
The percent change in consumer durable goods prices (DCPID) i
related to current and lagged changes in wholesale prices of con-
sumer durables (DWPICD);wage-rate changes in wholesale and re-
tail trade (DWRT), lagged one and two periods; and dummy vari-
ables for the 1965 excise-tax reduction (DMY6503).
Nondurables Excluding Food and Fuel
Food prices are treated separately elsewhere, and fuel prices are






R2 =0.83;SE =0.18;DW =1.8
108 Bosworth and VromanThe percent change in consumer nondurable prices (DCPINDEFF)
is related to current and lagged changes in wholesale prices of con-
sumer nondurables (DWP1NDEFF), wage rate changes in the trade
sector (DWRT), and the lagged unemployment rate (RU).
Services Excluding Rent
DCPISER =0.41DWRPNF +0.33DWRPNF1 +0.11DCPIMIR
(2.9) (2.3) (4.5)
—9.18RU_1 —0.34DCS58 —0.23DCS5&1 +1.20
(2.1) (4.2) (2.7) (3.1)
H2 =0.85;SE =0.23;DW =1.6
Changes in prices of consumer services (DCPISER) are related to
current and lagged wage changes in the private sector wage index
(DWRPNF), changes in mortgage interest rates (DCPIMIR), the
lagged unemployment rate (RU), and current and lagged changes in
the real output of the services sector (DCS58).
WholesalePrices
ConsumerNondurables Excluding Food and Fuel
DWPINDEFF =0.05DWPICMEFF +0.05DWPICMEFF1
(2.0) (2.0)
+0.16DWRM +0.19DWRM1 +0.12DWRM.2 +0.03KUM2 —2.41
(3.5) (4.3) (2.5) (3.2) (3.5)
R2 =0.53;SE =0.25; DW=1.3
Changes in finished goods prices (DWPINDEFF) are related to cur-
rent and lagged changes in prices of raw materials (DWPICMEFF),
changes in wage rates (DWRM) over three quarters, and capacity
utilization (KUM).
Consumer Durable Goods




R2 =0.53;SE =0.31;DW =1.6
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+ 0.20DWRM2 +0.04KUM —0.18D4PROTh2 —3.67 11
(4.0) (4.6) (2.9) (4.8)
R2=0.6;SE=O.29;DW=l.4
Changes in prices of capital goods (DWP1PFG) are related to
changes in costs of raw materials, changes in wage rates over three
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TheBosworth-Vroman appraisal of the wage-price control program
is disturbingly reminiscent of the play Six Characters in Search of
an Author. The authors present a myriad of scintillating facts,
figures, and questions, all in search of a coherent intellectual frame-
work. As the curtain falls on Pirandello's play, the audience is left
struggling to distinguish illusion from reality. Similarly, at the con-
clusion of the Bosworth-Vroman paper, the issues addressed remain
as provocative and essentially unresolved as they were at the be-
ginning. After reading the paper, I was left with a sense of frustra-
tion and uncertainty, reflecting not simply the complexity of the
issues involved but also the flabbiness of the state of the art and the
particular weaknesses inherent in the approach followed by the
authors.
The paper begins with a factual description of wage and price
behavior from 1960 through the middle of 1971. In the section en-
titled "Prelude to Controls," the authors raise the question of
whether the precontrol inflation was coming to an end as a result of
the restrictive stabilization policies embodied in the original "game
plan." This issue is seen as "crucial to any judgment about the
effect of the controls." The authors conclude that "the inflation
rate ...didnot decelerate, and most economic forecasts made dur-
ing the 1969—1971 period consistently underpredicted the magni-
tude of actual wage and price increases."
What evidence is brought to bear to sustain the claim that infla-
tion was not decelerating during this period? The gross evidence is
as follows:
The rate of increase in the CPI during the first eight months of
1971 fell to 3.8 percent, compared to an average of 5.9 percent
in 1970.
The private nonfarm deflator showed a decline from 5 percent to
3.9 percent.
The WPI showed an increase from 3.7 percent to 4.6 percent.
Aggregate wage indexes showed a continuation of wage increases
at approximately 1970 rates, while negotiated settlements ex-
hibited modest deceleration.
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half of the decline is accounted for by the reversal in mortgage
interest rates; they minimize the decline in the private nonfarm
deflator by citing the smaller decline registered by the fixed weight
deflator; and they place an unwholesome weight on the probiematic
WPI by concluding that "evidence of a quick end to inflation is
limited to consumer finished good prices, with some indication
from intermediate materials prices that even this slowdown was
transitory." Unfortunately, we.are not told what specific type of
evidence would have persuaded them that inflation was indeed
decelerating during this period. This section would have been con-
siderably stronger had it included an analysis of the peculiarities of
the construction and weighting patterns of the different inflation
indexes along with some conceptual guidance for selecting an
"appropriate" measure of inflation. The conceptual issue is particu-
larly acute given the vexing divergences among various measures
of inflation.
The next section contains a cursory overview of the controls pro-
gram, outlining its organization and administration and ending with
a recounting of actual price and wage changes during the period of
controls. The authors describe the observed dampening in inflation
rates during phases I and II and the abrupt acceleration in inflation
during 1973 when the CPI rose at a rate of 8.8 percent and the WPI
at 15.5 percent.
The main section of the paper, "Econometric Results," is begun
with the observation that "a simple comparison of prices and wage
increases before and during the period of controls does not provide
a very satisfactory basis for evaluating the effects of contro's."
Nevertheless, in the very next sentence the authors assert that
"only in a few situations is the magnitude of change in the pattern
of inflation sufficient for us to conclude that the change was a result
of controls." Nowhere do we find the basis for such an inference.
How large would the observed deceleration in a price index have
to be in order to warrant the inference that the controls caused the
deceleration?
As an alternative to simply looking at the behavior of observed
prices, the authors consider the use of econometric models to gen-
erate counterfactual forecasts of the predicted behavior of prices
and wages in the absence of controls. This approach, too, is viewed
as unsatisfactory because "the precontrol period is not well ex-
plained by existing statistical equations." Moreover, "some of the
disturbances during the period of controls, such as devaluation and
changes in international commodity markets, are difficult to in-
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factors."
Despite their own realistic reservations, Bosworth and Vroman
t go on boldly to elect a very simple specification of a wage equation
c to use for generating counterfactual forecasts. They specifically
s reject a number of the refinements in the wage equation introduced
by R. J. Gordon and assert that alternative specifications would not
s have affected their analysis of the controls. They do not detail the
f nature of any of the tests performed on alternative specifications
I and thus the paper offers no real insight into the sensitivity of wage
- predictionsfrom alternatively specified equations.
f The authors depict the percent change in money wages as de-
pending on the unemployment rate, an arbitrarily weighted average
of past-quarter changes in the CPI and a wage-price guidepost
- dummyto give uniform weighting to the 1962—1966 guidepost
S period. These regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares,
and the results are highly suspect. Several of the equations indicate
very substantial problems of serial correlation, thus calling into
question the adequacy of the specification and the usefulness of
conventional tests of significance. The authors mention this prob-
lem, but I suspect that they underestimate its importance. Recent
ti simulation results by Granger and Newbold suggest that standard
I errors might be underestimated by a factor of five, thus raising con-
siderable doubts about the adequacy of the equations presented.
fl The authors also note that their estimated parameters are highly
e sensitive to the time period selected for fitting the model. The dele-
tion of two earlier years of observations from the data set and the
addition of one and a half later years causes a 50 percent reduction
it in the unemployment coefficient and a doubling of the price co-
efficient. On the basis of this evidence, I would strongly suspect
It that if the data set had been more appropriately divided into two
subperiods reflecting the years before and after the more rapid
inflation of the sixties, the equations would exhibit even greater
instability. Furthermore, the confidence ellipsoids on the param-
eters would be so large that acceptability of the model would be
doubtful as a useful counterfactual generator for an assessment of
- thecontrol period.
S The observed parametric instability indicates that the coefficient
1 on past prices seems to rise as actual inflationary experience in-
creases. This finding is probably an echo of the observation made
e by R. J. Gordon which prompted him to experiment with a variable
response coefficient that itself depended upon the severity of the
expected rate of inflation. Oi's Tests of the stability of the Gordon
AnAppraisal of the Wage-Price Control Program 115
Lwage equation also indicated radical changes in the coefficients
between the subperiods 1954—1961 and 1962—1970. It is certainly
like yat as expected inflation acce erates, more anmore wage
contracts will include escalator clauses. Bosworth and Vroman do
not, however, pursue this line of inquiry and retain, instead, a
simple fixed coefficient model.
The model specifications presented are disconcerting in other
regards as well. Nowhere in their paper can I find even a passing
suggestion that monetary and fiscal policies might also have some
effects on the course of the inflationary process. Neither monetary
nor fiscal variables appear in any of the econometric specifications.
Given these various problems, it is perhaps not so surprising that
the equations grossly underpredict the actual rates of wage inflation
in the period immediately preceding the controls.
The authors seem to take some comfort in the finding of a similar
pattern of underestimation in models estimated by Perry and
Mitchell. Such underestimation raises the question of whether
these large residuals reflect a fundamental change in an otherwise
stable structure of wage formation or simply an inadequate repre-
sentation of the historical process generating wages. Since the re-
ported wage equations show little stability over time, I am hard
pressed to accept an ad hoc rationalization of this apparent empir-
ical anomaly. While it is true that underprediction of this kind has
been reported for the same period in several studies, the latter
should not be regarded as each contributing independent evidence
of the phenomenon, since they are all based on models that are
essentially similar and are estimated from essentially the same
body of data.
The predictions used to assess the impact of controls are based on
simulations of the simple wage equations, using actual values of the
right-hand-side variables, which include lagged prices. To the ex-
tent that controls had any effect on holding down prices—for
example, during the Phase I freeze—such an effect will be included
erroneously in the predicted rate of change in wages for subsequent
periods and thereby contaminate the counterfactual forecast with
the effects of controls. In general, Bosworth and Vroman find that
actual wage increases are substantially above predicted wage in-
creases both before and after the control period. To illustrate, the
equations for union-negotiated increases in manufacturing under-
predict the actual increase by 3 percent for the second half of 1971
(annual rate) and underpredict the nonmanufacturing increase by a
whopping 5.9 percent. The manufacturing equation cited has a
reported Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.60 and should probably have
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—been discarded on that basis alone. The large positive residuals
only turn negative and greater than 1 percent in the second half of
1973, and this reversal appears due to the burst in prices in the first
part of 1973.
Bosworth and Vroman note that the control program focused on
settlements and thus "equations based on hourly earnings data may
r understate the long-run impact of the [controll program." This
effect suggests to them that "the full impact of controls on hourly
earnings would extend beyond the initial periods with a cumulative
effect." This suggestion provides an interesting justification for
using data including the 1973 price explosions for assessing the
control program. However, upon examining the settlement data,
the authors find that the deceleration there is not reflected in aver-
age hourly earnings, which in fact rise sharply during the third and
fourth quarters of 1973.
In examining the construction industry, the authors simply focus
on a tabular presentation of the wage data because "regression
analysis of construction industry wages changes has not been very
successfi.il." However, if an equation capable of forecasting the be-
havior of construction wages in the absence of controls cannot be
found, it is hard to see what basis of inference can be used to assess
the control period.
The next section, "Controls and Negotiated Wage Settlements,"
again stresses the greater impact of wage controls on negotiated
settlements rather than hourly earnings and relies on tabular rather
than econometric evidence. Data are presented on the average size
of contract settlements and their relative dispersion with the con-
elusion that "both... weresharply reduced during the period of
wage controls." The authors assert that "the abruptness of this
change creates a strong presumption that the controls were a sig-
nificant causal factor."
The section dealing with the "Impact of Prices" is motivated by a
fascinating issue. The authors note that since control regulations
varied among major sectors of the economy, it is possible to evalu-
ate the impacts of different types of control by a study of the
separate sectors.
In order to estimate the effects of controls in the separate sectors,
the authors utilize a variant of Popkin's stage-of-process framework.
Prices in particular sectors are specified to depend upon current
and lagged values of wholesale prices, current and lagged wages,
an assortment of dummy variables, capacity utilization rates, un-
employment rates, and labor productivity measures. No attempt is
made to give a theoretical justification for any of the specific equa-
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nificant coefficients were deleted from the regressions, and the lag
structures are the result of experimentation." While such candor
about empirical experimentation is refreshing and commendable,
the experimentation itself does not inspire much confidence in the
inferences derived from equations so selected. The equations are
estimated from data covering the period 1956—1970, yet no attempt
is made to test the structural stability assumption in spite of the
aforementioned instability reported for the aggregate price equa-
tions. Once again, counterfactual predictions are generated by
using actual values of variables the authorities were trying to regu-
late, leading to a potential underestimation of the control effect.
The authors acknowledge this problem of understatement, but
make no attempt to use predicted rather than actual values of those
variables, nor do they make any effort to assess the magnitude of
the effect.
A recurring feature of these sections is the resort to ad hoc inter-
pretation. While one cannot help but admire the wealth of insti-
tutional materials which the authors interweave with their econo-
metric residuals, the collage of assorted findings is unnervingly
capricious. A —2.5 percent residual for durables is dismissed as
being "almost wholly due to the automobile excise tax cut." Erratic
residuals in the manufacturing price series, ranging from —2.1 per-
cent to +3.6 percent, are explained as being "caused by changes in
the timing of automobile price increases. ...Thus,the inclusion of
the price increases of early 1974 would substantially reduce the
estimated effect of controls. Alternatively, exclusion of the last half
of 1973 results in average values of the residuals very close to zero."
On the other hand, residuals of —1.9 percent and —2.8 percent for
nondurables are regarded as "more consistent in indicating a re-
straining influence of the controls."
This type of "now you see it, now you don't" empiricism ulti-
mately leads the authors to conclude that "in general, the results...
imply a smaller direct impact of controls on prices than would be
inferred from a simple examination of the price indexes," and that
"dis aggregation indicated the importance of special factors such as
removal of the automobile excise tax, the adoption of no-fault insur-
ance, and the delay of automobile price increases." I find little
basis for such inferences in the detailed empirical work presented
in the paper. Too many ofthe authors' rich institutional insights are
squandered in attempting to explain residuals from econometric
equations in which the authors justifiably have little confidence.
Moreover, it is disappointing to discover how little can be inferred
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their analysis;
• On the question of whether the shift to Phase III was responsible
for an acceleration of inflation, the authors first argue that the accel-
eration was "more than accounted for by a sharp rise of raw ma-
terials costs, the impact on labor costs of the increase in social insur-
ance taxes, and the delayed implementation of the automobile
price increases." We then learn that "this may be too simple a basis
• on which to conclude that the shift was not important." Finally, we
are assured that "given the size of later increases in food prices, raw
• materials shortages, and the second devaluation, the shift to
Phase III was not a major factor in the 1973 price inflation."
In summarizing their findings, the authors claim that their esti-
mated impact of controls on prices is "somewhat smaller than that
implied by previous studies." These differences are attributed to
differences in both the underlying equations and the data base.
• A careful study by Kraft and Roberts makes possible an examination
• of the consequences of different model specifications on the esti-
• mates of the effect of controls for a given body of data. However, to
• date, no one has carefully examined the implications of using dif-
• ferent definitions of inflation.
Bosworth and Vroman conclude that their estimate of price re-
straint "waz smaller than implied by other studies," and they are
doubtful that a "significant squeezing of profit margins occurred."
Given their broad results indicating that controls had virtually no
effect, it seems odd that they should begin their final section with
the summary statement, "the interpretation of the control program
presented in the previous sections is more favorable than that held
• by most economists or the general public." They then proceed to
• enumerate the various "causes" of the 1973 inflation including, of
course, the oil embargo, devaluation, food shortages, expansion in
the industrialized countries, and speculative pressures in the com-
modity markets. Their favorable impression of the control program
is apparently justified by the remark that "not one of these develop-
ments was in any way caused by wage and price controls nor were
they the types of inflation problems for which controls were a
potential cure." If the most favorable observations that can be made
about controls are that (a) they did not work to reduce inflation and
(b) that they did not cause the oil embargo, the devaluation, the
food shortages, etc., then perhaps the time has come to bury con-
trols once and for all. Instead, Bosworth and Vroman gently con-
clude that the control program was "a modest effort with modest
results" and that "a major benefit was the justification provided for
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increasing the level of resource utilization." Is it not at least con-
ceivable that some of that redirected monetary and fiscal policy has
contributed to the exacerbation of our inflationary problems?
H
U.S.D
120 Comments by Feige
-t J